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Case No. 11801

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

This case deals with a condemnation action wherein
the plaintiff and appellant herein condemned portions of
land owned by defendants, I Yor D. Jones and Rua C.

Jones, his ·wife, in connection with the construction of
Iuterstat<> Highway rn. The land is located between
City, Utah, and Summit, Utah. The defendants
did not protest the rio·ht
of the State of Utah to cont->
demn the property and sometime prior to the date of
the trial the Court entered an order of immediate occupancy permitting- the plaintiff and appellant to occupy
the property. r:l'he trial was for the sole purpose of de-
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termining the damages sustained to the <lefondanh; aiid
respondents herein as a resnlt of the taking.
STATEMEl'-JT OI7 F:":-CTS

Respondents feel that it \Yill he of considerable benefit to the Court to set forth herein a statement of facts
pertinent to the issues.

Tlw respondents' statement is

to provide facts in addition to those set forth in the:
appellant's statement as to the disposition in the Lower
Court.
Plaintiff-appellant's statement of facts fail to
disclose the defendants-respondents, Ivor D. ,Jones and
Rua C. Jones, bis 'wife, i11 connection ·with their son anr1
business associates in Las Vegas, Nevada, had proceeded with the development of a subdivision on portions of the property owned by defendants-respondents.
The subdivision, as originally planned, included the
parcels of property identified in the plaintiff-appellant's
statement of facts and also included the tracts of land
which were severed b.v the construction of I-15.
U. S. Highway 91, which is the highway which has
been in existence for mm1y years and which was the
highway serving the area from Cedar City north to
Summit, Utah, bisected the property owned by defendants-respondents.

The portion of the defendantFi-respon-

dents' property which was contemplated as the area to
be subdivided was situated in the area which \ms hi-
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serted by U. S. Highway !H. This property was easily
aeecssibie from U. S. Highway 91.
Dcfendants-responclents, and their associates, had
been substantially involved in the subdivision development for a considerable period before they were advised
that Interstate Higfrway 15 ·would be bisecting their
property. Preliminary plans had heen made, engineering, surveys and reports as ·well as preliminary drawings of the subdivision had been completed. Defendantsrespondents contacted the plaintiff-appellant as soon as
they and their associates were aware that the Interstate Highway System may bisect their property. At the
time of the initial contact with the official representatives of the plaintiff-appellant by defendants-respondents and their associates, there appeared to be no certain route established as to where the highway would
bisect the subject property. To eliminate the confusion that the defendants-respondents knew ·would result
from the new highway travelling through the proposed
subdivision and the limitation on access rights in connection therewith, the defendants-respondents abandoned
that portion of the snbdiYision situated at or near the
route which ·was determined to be the most probable
route of Interstate I-15. All that portion of the proposed subcliYision situated sonth ancl east of the existing
Highway 01 was abandoned and the plans progressed on
seheclule with the remaining portion of the subdivision
situated north and west of Hig·hway 91.
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At the time the Court entered the order of immediate occupancy, the subdivision of the defendants-respondents and their
known as ''Village Green
F'arms'' had progressed to the :point where the subdiYision plats had b8en approved by the County Uornmissioners and the interested parties had proceeded with
sales of subdivision lots.

It should also be clarified that substantially all of
the defendants-respondents', Ivor D. Jones and Rua C.
Jones', property in the parcel owned by them in the area
between Cedar City and Summit, Utah, is flat grazing
land except those portions of property contemplated in '
the original subdiYision which are situated up near the
low hills which parallel the highway.

The property

planned for the original subdivision on the east and
south side of the old high·way (this is the property subsequently abandoned) has small rolling hills and a gradual slope upward with a view of the entire valley from
almost any location en the property.
Plaintiff-appellant's statement of facts outlines the
parcels specifically b:.- number and acres and the eff"ect
of the condemnation on each.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

The trial court did not err in allowing the clef endants' testimony respecting values of property. In fact,

•>

the testimony as presentecl was not as characterized by
upp<' llaut

''on a sn hdi Yision ha sis." The testimony of

fror D.•Tone;.; ( rrr. eommencing p. 28) discloses that the
pro1ierty a ctn ally taken, m; well as the property severed
011

i he sou tl1 and east of the highway, was to have been

in the original snbdivi8ion.

The testimony further

,.,hows that the s11bdivision which did in fact develop was
ad,jacc'nt to

which was to become and later

<licl become an access road or frontage road used in connection with the Int<:'rstat0 Highway System.
Ivor D ..Jones testified that in his judgment the
property had a value based upon its highest and best
use at the time of taking of $1,500.00 per acre (Tr. 29).
The testimony of l\Iarcellus Palmer (Tr. commencrng page 49) outlined the methods of appraisal which
were evaluated by him i11 connection with the subject
propert>- and discloses the type of appraisal or approach
to the appraisal placed upon the property by this wit11ess.

The testimony of Mr. Palmer as to the method of

or approach to the appraisal coincides with the judgment of the plaintiff-appellant's expert witness, Mr. Ken
\Villiam Esplin.

They hoth nsed what they defined to

be tlw market-data method or approach to appraisal.
('outran· to the claim of plaintiff-appellant that
the defendant failed to prodnee any acceptable e,·idence
('f nllue on the subject

the> testimony clearly

established that both Mr. Ivor D. Jones and Mr. l\far-
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cellus Palmer determined that the highest arn1 h0st

llR('

of the property would be "rural homesit0 pro11<'rh"
(Tr. 50).
Mr. l\Iarcellus Palmer's testimony c1iseloses that
he was eminently qualified to appraise the suhject property and that he was Yery familiar ·with tli0 g0neral nrea,
having appraised properties in c0nnectio11 with Ii
operations, farming operations, grazmg operations,
mountain and rural subdiYision de\-elopments and rural
homesite developments.
Mr. Palmer testified that he was aware of, examined and considered, the comparable sales of property
in and about the Iron Connty and Southern utah area.
Based upon his examination of the subject property and
his knowledge gained from his investigation respecting
other properties in the area, he formulated a judgment
that the highest and best use of the subject property at
the time the condemnation action was commenced was
for the development of homesites. The Yalne established
by Mr. Palmer, based upon its highest and best use for
the property was $] ,490.00 per acre for the acreage
taken.
We believe that defendants-respondents' approach
to establish the value

assessed to the subject prop-

erty falls well within the outline of the Utah Supreme
Court in the case of State of Utalt rs. Tedesco, 4 Utah
2d 248, 291 Pac. 2d 1028.

In the Tedesco case, the de-

i'endant 's expert 1Yitncsscs had apparently "arrived at
tl1ei r dctc rmination as tu the \'alue of the property hy
tlw sales prie<•s of comparable 1011' in thr ,·icinity,
a ...;siµning sneh nllnrs to the individual lots involved in
tlwt litigation, aml adding thrm up, without
a11y cost or expenHe incident to tlw i'iale of <:>ach of the

lots at the time \Yithin wl1icli the lots

have been

sold.'' In the instant case, the expert "·itness compared
the ,·alue of the lots in the adjacent snhdiYision, which
\ms the sn hdivision of which the subject property was
to

originally been a part, deducted from the aver-

age price of said lots the cost of water, the cost of engineering, the cost of s11hdi,·ision planning, de\·elopment
and filing, deducted therefrom the commission costs anticipatin{-\· the sah• of lots

a means whereby commis-

sions would he required anc1 thereafter, deducted an additional amount for othrr contingencies and profit. The
r<:>maining nilue was, in the judgment of the expert witnt>ss, the priC'c that a reasonahlr buyer would b<:> willing
to pay for the subject

The expert witness for

the defendants c1ic1 in fact dN1nct all such items as ap1wared to ht> oh.iertionahle to the Conrt in the State
T e1frsr·o case.

1'8.

Plaintiff-appellant argues that the Yalu<' of the propshould he based upon a sing-le unit, regardless of
\YhateYer the state of compl<'tion of a subdivision may
he, and a fair market Yalue is the price that such property will bring from a

pnrehasing; the whole

8
tract.

The testimony of Mr. Palmer was elearly to tbi,

effect.

Mr. Palmer established that, based Hpon his in-

vestigation of the entire area arnl after a determination
of what salc8 to use as comparable sales, he madt• tht:
necessary and appropriate adjustments to determine the
\·alue of the ground per acre and placed an aggn•gah•
value on the total acreage predicated upon the number
of acres times the Yalne prr acre. Contrary to the claim
of plaintiff-appellant that such an approach results in
a realization of a prof it on the property, the teHtimony
clearly shows that tlw deduetions were made to reduce
the value to raw acreage, extracting therefrom the profit
and all other costs incurred and reasonably assessed i11
increasing the comparable property to the market Yalne
it then enjoyed.
Esplin, the expert witness called by the plaintiff-appellant, testified that he disregarded any Yalue
whatsoever to the subdi,·ision adjoining the subject property.

He indicated that he determined that in his best

judgment the highest and best use of the subject property was for grazing and for a livestock operation and
no value whatsoever could he attributed to the suhcfo·ision adjacent thereto.
The case of State of rrtnh, by a11d tl1ro1u1l its Ronrl
1

Commission
872) clearly

1·.

Rulo11 8. 1Food, (22 Utah 2d .'J17, 45? Pac.

on page 87:5 lhereof 'that the

landowner is entitled to share in an,v general enhance-
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ment which affects the land in the area up to the time
of the taking.'' Thr Court in the ·wood case refers to
and reaffirms the position taken by the Utah Supreme
Conrt in the case of State, by nnd through its Road Commission c . .JacolJs, lU Utah 2d 167, 397 Pac. 2d 463,

wherein it was heltl that the owner is entitled to the evaluation of his property at the time it was taken on the
basis of the highest and best nse and that is "without
limitation as to the nse then actually made of it.''
The State's witness, Mr. Esplin, failed to offer any
explanation whatsoe\'er as to the difference between the
subject property and the property adjacent thereto in
the subdivision. He testified that in his opinion the
subject property had a value of $50.00 per acre and
that its Yalue was not increased by the fact that it was
adjacent to a subdivision of lots of 1.25 acres each, selling for $2,150.00 to $2,250.00 per lot.
Mr. Palmer's testimony on behalf of the landowner,
established that he had considered many facors in the
surrounding area, including other comparable properties,
properties purchased for subdiYision purposes and properties purchased for other purposes.

Based upon his

investigation and e''alnation of possible comparable
sales, he established the foundation for his judgment as
to the value of the
with the adjustments as
hereinabove ref erred. Contrarywise, Mr. Esplin, the
expert called to testify on behalf of the plaintiff, estab-

JO

lished a value arbitrarily upon a jud;.!,ment that tlH' lanu
in question had one use and one' use

that

for

grazing and/or livestock operations, and disreganle><l
any influence that the <leYelopment or other use lwingmade of 8Urronnding properties. ·we feel that this
contrary to the intent of +lw 8fofr' r. TVowl and 8tntr

r. Jacobs cases lwrein he fore ci tcd.
POINT II

That counsel for defendants-respondents clo<'s not
agree with plaintiff-appellant's position that the ladies

'

of the jury were confused.

1

The evidence clearly estab-

lishecl that there was indeed a substantial loss to the
defendants-respondents.

There is little doubt that the

jury determined the valne of the ground to be far in
excess of the value placed upon the same by Mr. Esplin.
The jury personally visited the property in the presence
of the Judge and had an opportunity to vie\v the subject
properties for themselYes an<l determined that the subject property being taken hy the Tnterstate Hig"11way
and the property being severed from the remaining
property aml left in three small parcels to the sonth and
east of the interstate highway with limited access, was
in fact property that had a much higher and better use
than most of the remaining acreage. This property was
located on a sloping hillside with an excellent view of
the entire valley. It was adjacent to the "Village Green
Farm'' subdivision which was in the process of develop-
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meut at the time the jury visited the property.

The

p\·idence also elearly establishes that the actual property
se\·ered and left in the three small parcels on the south
and east of thr interstate highway was acreage which,
because of its location and excellent view, was of even
higlier Yalue per acre than the actual acreage taken by
the highway.
It was equall;· clear that the small parcels of the

subject property remaining on the south and east of
the new Interstate Highway T-15 would have little or
limited use. The only aceess to the small remaining parcels after the completion of the highway will be by travel through a linstock underpass some distance from the
parcels and rrturn by frontag;e road.

The parcels were

rach isolated from the other and each too small to have
any substantial value for the purpose that the property
was intended prior to the taking.

Every witness indi-

cated that there would be a ,-ery substantial reduction
in the ,-aluc of the property on the east and south of
I-15 which was cut off and separated from the balance

the new highway.

The n1lne the jury placed on the

se\·erance was wrll below the ,-alue of the same as indiC'ated by ::\Ir .•Jones and Mr. Palmer and also compatable
who indicated that the
with the testimon>· of Mr.
rnlne wonlcl hr reduced hy fifty percent of thr ,-alue oi
the propert>· before the takinp;. The verdict of the jury
as to the ,-alnr of the io;everance loss waio; founded on a
sound and reasonable interpretation b>- them of the eYi-
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deuce before them.
The verdict of th<' ;1ury is clear that it was tlw desire of the ladies acting as jurors in this cause to recognize and !.!,Tant to the defendants-respondents a sum in
the amount of
. 921.:-rn to compensate them for tlw
total loss sustained to them as a result of the Interstate
Highway 15
their property.
It is not a proper conclusion for the plaintiff-appellant to infer that because defendants-respondents did
not object or protest the adion of the trial court in reducing the judgment to $8,000.00 as an inference that
the jury was confused or that the defendants-respondents acquiesced and agreed to the reduction.
A reading of the Trial Court's finding No. 12 will
disclose that the Trial Court reduced the judgment from
$13,921.30 to an arbitrary figure of $8,000.00. The finding further states that ''in the event the defendants file
objections thereto within fifteen days of the date hereof
that a new trial will he granted.'' The finding goes on
to state that ''if no objections were filed, the Clerk is
directed to enter judgment for defendants.'' The fact
that defendants concluded that the additional cost of a
trial with the high cost of expert fees, testimony, counsel
fees and expenses wonld be sufficiently high to consume
a major portion of tlw difference between the $13,921.30
and the $8,000.00 is certainly not sufficient to infer that
the defendants-respondents acquiesced and agreed to the
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reduction.

This was simply a judgment made in the

matter based upon the practicalities involved in any
type of litigation.
The defendants-respondents assert that the action
of the Trial Judge in reducing the judgment from the
verdict awarded by the jury of $13,921.30 to $8,000.00
was in fact an error by the Trial Judge. However, based
upon the wording of the Court's findings, the def endants-respondents were placed in the very awkward position of either agreeing to the amount even though not
agreeing to the justification for the reduction, or having a new trial on the case "-ith the> expenses and costs
attendant thereto.
The defendants-respondents assert that the error
of the Lower Court should he rectified by a reinstatement of the original verdict of $13,921.30. The Courts
in the State of Utah have upheld the right of a trial
judge to overrule the verdict of a jury where the verdict
is clearly unjust. However, the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah has indicated on many occasions that the
verdict of the jury should not be interfered with unless
there appears some compelling reason why justice demands that it be done. In the case of Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 113, 388 Pac. 2d 409,

the Supreme Court of the State of Utah set aside an order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, with
the following- comments :
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''Due to their a<lvantuged pus1t1011 in clo:-;e
proximity to the trial, the partie::-; and the
es; and their practical know ledge of the affair 8 ot '
life as a backgrouml again::-;t which tu weigh the ,
evidence, the asse::-;sme11t of damage's is ::-;omethi 11 ,,
peculiarly within the
of the jmy to UP-"'
termine, aud the court is extremely reluctant to
interfere 'Yith their judgment i11
regard.
From the plaintiil 's point of view, their insistence
that the a"·anl is inadequate to her needs and <lesires is uuderstan<lable but we are obliged to look
at the e\·iclence and the reasonable inference::-; to
he drawn therefrom in the light most f m·orahlP
to the ver<lict. In doing so, we do not see it
•
so extremely lw:·ond reason as to ref!nire that we
upset it."
The Court in the Campbell case \\·ent on to statr
that:
''Under our s:·stern it is contemplated that the
right to trail b:· jur:· be assured. This is something more than a high-sounding phrase to be declaimed on patriotic ocrasions. It is the duty of
courts to honor it in the observance. \Vhenever
there is a genuine dispute as to the issues of the
fact upon which the parties' rights depend, they
are entitled to have them submitted to and settled
by a jun·. \Vhen the parties have had a fnll ancl
fair opportnnity to present their cause, and the
jury has rendered its verdict, it should not be interfered with unless there appeari-; some compelling reason wh:· jni-;ticc demands tlrnt it b0 done."
The parties in the instant case each fairly presented testimon:r respecting· th0 damages r0snlting to the
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defendants-respondents in connection with the highway
condemnation proceedings to the jury empaneled in Iron
County, Utah, for the determination of the facts in the
instant case. A re,·iew of the testimony discloses that
there was a genuine dispute as to the issues and the
yalues. The parties and each of them were, therefore,
entitled to have the case submitted to the jury and settled by the jury.

The verdict of the jury rendered

thereafter should not be interfered with. There appears
no just or compelling reason that would demand such
interference.

Consequently, it is the position of the

defendants-respondents that the Court erred in reducmg the judgment.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has upheld the right of a District Court to order a remittiter
or a new trial as was set forth herein. The Supreme
Court of the State of Utah as particularly set forth in
Ruf v. Association of World Tra1:el Exchange, 10 Utah
2d 249, 351 Pac. 2d 623, has upheld the right of the Su-

preme Court to order a remittiter of all or part of a
jury verdict; provided, however, the requirement of the
Ruf case is that the award be "obYiously above any
reasonable appraisal in the damages suffered.'' In the
instant case, the testimony of the def endants-respondents' witnesses would appear to ha Ye been received by
the jury as more reasonable than the testimony and
evidence presented by the plaintiff-appellant. Consequently, there is ample evidence before the Court for
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the jury to base its verdict as determined herein in the
amount of $13,921.30.
CONCLUSION

Defendants - respondents submit that the Trial
Court's judgment reducing the verdict of the jury from
$13,921.30 to $8,000.00 should be set aside and the verdict heretofore rendered by the jurors in this cause be
reinstated, that judgment be entered on said verdict accordingly, with costs to these respondents; or, in the
alternative, that the Court affirm the judgment of the
lower Court as to the judgment of $8,000.00, with costs
to respondents.

Respectfully submitted,
CLINE, JACKSON & JACKSON'

Attorneys for Respondents

